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Abstract 
Party attachments shape perceptions of the political context, but neither are they fixed nor do 
they completely blind supporters to the political reality. When severe societal challenges such 
as the European debt or refugee crises force parties to change their policies or make formerly 
inconsequential positions salient and thus relevant, party identifiers may find their policy 
preferences at odds with their party identification. This may lead party supporters to adopt 
their party’s position. However, if the inconsistent position is sufficiently important, party 
identifiers may also loosen the ties to their party. We use individual-level data from the GLES 
campaign panels 2009–2017 to show how these crises have prompted identifiers to follow the 
party line in some cases, but have even more often weakened or even eroded party attachments 
among supporters who hold strong positions. In effect, the European debt crisis and 
particularly the European refugee crisis appear to have contributed to an issue-based 
reshuffling of the partisan balance in German politics. 
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Introduction1 
Like many Western democracies, Germany has undergone a period of dealignment 
(Dalton 2012). As partisan independents are particularly likely to switch their vote from one 
election to the next (Schoen 2003), the erosion of party attachments makes the electorate more 
responsive to external changes and the partisan balance more flexible. However, it may also 
undermine the stability of the party system. Party attachments serve as a stabilizing force 
because party identifiers often stick to their parties despite their parties’ inability to meet their 
demands. Moreover, some party identifiers may even adjust their positions to the party line to 
accommodate unexpected policy shifts. This is because their attachments provide a perceptual 
screen, which structures and stabilizes political attitudes and behavior (e.g., Bartels 2002; 
Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002; Lenz 2012). Although the notion might be unappealing 
to proponents of bottom-up theories of democracy (Achen and Bartels 2016), party 
identification may thus inhibit, or at least limit, protest voting and party defection. 
Consequently, it may enable (mainstream) parties and the party system as such to survive severe 
social, economic, or political challenges forcing unpopular political decisions largely 
unscathed. For the German political system, the European debt crisis and the European refugee 
crisis represented such challenges, which may have underscored the importance of party 
attachments as a stabilizing force. 
However, serious societal challenges not only emphasize the desirability of party 
attachments as a stabilizing force but may also undermine partisan ties. While it is widely 
accepted that ties to political parties shape perceptions of the political context, they do not 
completely blind party adherents to the political reality (e.g., Redlawsk et al. 2010). Under 
certain circumstances, partisan attachments may be weakened or even abandoned or changed 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Green et al. 2002). For instance, parties may have to make policy choices 
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that contradict their traditional policy stances in order to cope with severe internal and external 
challenges. Although party supporters may ignore or reinterpret such policy changes as 
matching their own preferences, crises increase the salience of political choices. Party 
identifiers are thus more likely to perceive the mismatch between their preferences and their 
party’s policies in times of crisis. Such feelings of dissonance are likely to disaffect party 
supporters, some of whom may choose to abandon their partisan ties. Along these lines, the 
societal challenges faced by the German political system in the last decade may have 
undermined the attachments of party identifiers in the German electorate, potentially furthering 
the dealignment process or even engendering realignment. Party identifiers may have learnt 
that their policy preferences are at odds with policies pursued by the party they identify with. 
In turn, attachments to parties in government that were considered responsible for resolving 
crises may have weakened or even eroded. Rather than underscoring the stabilizing function of 
party attachments, these challenges may thus have shaken the prevalence and balance of party 
attachments in Germany. Against this backdrop, we examine how identifiers’ policy positions 
and party attachments have changed during the debt and the refugee crisis, considering their 
perceptions of parties’ policies. 
 
Party Attachments in Periods of Crises 
The role of party identification as a force of its own, guiding identifiers’ perceptions, 
attitudes, and behavior, has been at the heart of the concept since its inception (Campbell et al. 
1960). Nowadays, it is widely accepted that the relationship between party identification and 
novel experiences is flexible (e.g., Leeper and Slothuus 2014). Accordingly, party attachments, 
understood as psychological bonds, may induce partisan motivated reasoning (e.g., Campbell 
et al. 1960; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006) and guide voters’ political perception, 
information processing, and decision-making (e.g., Evans and Pickup 2010; Huddy et al. 2015). 
The degree to which party attachments exert these effects may depend on several individual-
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level and contextual factors. For example, strong partisan ties are more resistant to change and 
exert stronger effects on perceptions, attitudes, and behavior than weak ones. Moreover, high 
levels of partisan polarization increase the salience of party attachments and thus make partisan 
considerations more accessible to voters (e.g., Druckman et al. 2013; also Jerit and Barabas 
2012; Nicholson 2012). Accordingly, strong identifiers may be particularly inclined to vote for 
their party and support its politicians, performance, and policies, especially in political 
environments in which party attachments are highly salient. 
However, even in periods of high polarization, parties cannot always count on the 
unconditional support of their adherents. This suggests that partisan motivated reasoning has 
limits and that other factors may also influence political information processing (e.g., Redlawsk 
et al. 2010). The political information citizens receive usually consists not only of partisan cues 
but also speaks to self-interest, other identities, values, and attitudes. Depending on voters’ 
perception of partisan cues and the importance they attach to relevant predispositions, the latter 
may come into play as a force of their own. In other words, the impact of party attachments 
may also depend on the weight party identifiers give to other predispositions. Accordingly, even 
strong identifiers may disapprove of their party leader’s misconduct or oppose a policy 
proposed by their party, if novel information suggests that their party did or proposed something 
that is at odds with a strongly held predisposition (e.g., Schoen et al. 2017). If this dissonance 
is large, party identifiers may even be willing to reconsider their party attachment (Jennings 
and Markus 1984).  
In real-world politics, conditions are usually quite favorable for party attachments. Most 
parties pay close attention not to change policy positions too quickly to prevent challenging 
their supporters’ preferences (e.g., Adams et al. 2014; Adams 2012). Moreover, parties’ policy 
positions, like the outcomes of government action, are seldom unequivocal, but rather 
ambiguous, providing parties and their adherents with considerable leeway for interpretation 
and frequently allowing identifiers to project their own policy positions on their parties (e.g., 
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Bisgaard 2015; Brody and Page 1972; Parker-Stephen 2013; Repass 1976). In times of crisis, 
however, parties may have to make hard choices and, consequently, to implement policies that 
contradict their traditional stance to limit the fallout of severe societal challenges. Because 
crises raise public attention, such contradictory policies tend to be highly visible and less open 
to interpretation. In consequence, crises increase the probability that party identifiers are 
confronted with information that puts their party affiliation at odds with other vital attitudes. In 
this vein, large-scale events that challenge many adherents’ party images have the potential to 
shake party affiliations and lead to a shift in the balance of party attachments in the electorate 
(Campbell et al. 1960: chaps. 7, 19; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Key 1959). 
 
Germany in Times of Crises 
Over the last decade, political discourse in Germany has focused heavily on a series of 
crises, including the European debt crisis and the European refugee crisis. To derive convincing 
expectations about party identifiers’ reactions to these crises, we require a thorough analysis of 
the flow of events, in general, and the behavior of parties, in particular. A crisis must be severe 
in several respects to shake deeply ingrained party identifications. Firstly, it must be salient 
enough to surpass the threshold of awareness. Secondly, because party attachments are central 
to identifiers’ belief systems, challenging them requires a crisis to touch upon an issue that is 
considered equally important. Thirdly, the crisis must either draw attention to parties’ positions 
on an issue that had not been salient prior to the crisis or force parties to revise their positions 
on an issue. If this is not the case, party adherents are unlikely to perceive any changes in the 
position of their party and hence have no reason to adopt the party position or to reconsider 
their attachment. In short, a crisis needs to be salient, speak to an important issue, and change 
identifiers’ perceptions of parties’ positions in order to affect party attachments. 
While many events described as political crises unfold without capturing the attention of 
a larger public, the two crises named above were, without doubt, very salient in citizens’ minds 
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(cf. Kratz and Schoen 2017). The European debt crisis entered German public awareness in 
2010, when the Eurozone countries passed the first European bailout package for Greece and 
the resolution to establish a European Stability Mechanism (ESM). In September 2011, public 
interest and media coverage skyrocketed after Bundestag and Bundesrat had approved an 
extension of the German guarantees and agreed to cut Greek debt by 50 percent three months 
later (Appendix 1; Picard 2015). Attention to the European refugee crisis rose sharply in 2015, 
when more than one million asylum seekers crossed the German border. Their arrival was 
extensively covered by the media and elicited heated discussions about immigration policies at 
all levels of society. All in all, these events were ubiquitous both in terms of media coverage 
and their prevalence in political debates at the time. 
Besides being highly salient, the crises also revolved around issues most citizens consider 
important, namely financial security and immigration attitudes (e.g., Lewis-Beck et al. 2008; 
Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). The European debt crisis threatened German 
savers’ investments and perpetuated the economic downturn brought about by the global 
financial crisis. Among citizens with restrictive immigration preferences, the one million 
asylum seekers entering Germany in 2015 aroused fears that the government had lost control 
over the German borders, resulting in indiscriminate mass immigration. The increase in the 
number of asylum seekers also prompted a larger public discussion about the feasibility of 
integration on such a large scale. Empirical evidence confirms that citizens were aware of these 
crises and considered them an important, if not the most important problem German politicians 
had to counter at the time (Kratz, Preißinger and Schoen, Chapter 7 in this volume). 
Party identifiers’ perceptions of their parties’ positions are less straightforward to assess. 
The European debt crisis did not induce major shifts in German parties’ policy positions, but it 
did result in serious intra-party rifts. This suggests that identifiers who favored the “losing” side 
of the internal debate may have felt abandoned by their parties. Eventually, all parties except 
the Left supported the bailout packages and the ESM, forming a broad parliamentary consensus 
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on how to respond to the crisis. However, factions within the governing parties CDU, CSU, and 
FDP insisted that the bailouts would lead to an unacceptable and illegal joint liability between 
the Eurozone states (Detjen 2014; Lange et al. 2014). The left wings of the largest opposition 
party, the SPD, and the smaller Greens aligned themselves with the Left in criticizing that the 
conditions of the bailout packages would inevitably lead to cuts in the social services of 
impacted countries (Lange et al. 2014). In consequence, the debt crisis provided opponents of 
the Euro rescue, who did not identify with the Left, with reasons to reconsider their party 
attachments, especially if their opposition to German aid was strong. At the extreme, supporters 
of SPD and Greens may have abandoned their party attachments, and some identifiers may even 
have switched their allegiance to the Left. Similarly, CDU, CSU, and FDP identifiers may have 
turned their backs on their parties. Considering that no (parliamentary) conservative party 
opposed the Euro rescue, these supporters are unlikely to have shifted their support to another 
party. Because the European debt crisis as well as the party positions pertaining to it were 
difficult to grasp, we may find that party identifiers who are highly interested in politics more 
readily reconsidered their party attachments. 
The situation was entirely different during the European refugee crisis. In August 2015, 
Chancellor Merkel spoke the often-quoted words “Wir schaffen das!” (“we can do this”), 
marking a major shift toward a more liberal immigration position of the CDU, the senior party 
in the governing grand coalition with the SPD (cf. Mader and Schoen 2019). This change was 
met with fierce criticism by the conservative wing of the CDU as well as the Bavarian sister 
party, the CSU. In consequence, not only the changed position of the CDU but also the more 
restrictive stance of the CSU became very salient for citizens. At the same time, the newly 
established AfD caught the public attention with its openly xenophobic anti-immigration 
positions and harsh attacks on the government’s allegedly lax immigration policy (Wuttke 
2019). We therefore expect weakening or eroding partisan ties and, in extreme cases, even an 
increased attachment to the CSU and the AfD among CDU identifiers opposing immigration. 
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In comparison, the left-wing parties SPD, Greens, and the Left faded into the background, as 
they all stuck with their pro-immigration stance. However, identifiers of these left-wing parties, 
who opposed immigration, may still have experienced a weakening or erosion of their party 
attachments due to the increased salience of their parties’ positions during the crisis. 
 
Data and Methodology 
We use two different types of survey data to test whether party identifiers, who perceived 
a large or increasing distance between their and their parties’ positions, ignored the resulting 
dissonance, followed their party’s position, or adapted their party attachments to reflect their 
own positions. We first look at long-term trends in identifiers’ and parties’ positions, drawing 
on a series of quarterly cross-section online surveys conducted between September 2009 and 
December 2017 as part of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES, online trackings 
T8-38, Roßteutscher et al. 2019). We then use data from the cumulated GLES campaign panels 
2009–2013 and 2013–2017 (Rattinger et al. 2016; 2018) to analyze intra-individual change 
during the two crises. As no survey waves were fielded between September 2009 and June 
2013, no data was collected during the height of the debt crisis in 2011/2012. Because we are 
interested in the long-term consequences of societal challenges rather than just in the short-term 
repercussions, this gap is not problematic for our analyses. In addition to the regular campaign 
waves, the campaign panel 2013–2017 includes two intermediate survey waves in 2014 and 
2015, the latter of which coincides with the climax of the refugee crisis. 
Across all data sets, we measure party identification using the German standard item, 
which asks respondents whether they have leaned toward a political party for an extended 
period of time and, if so, which party they have leaned toward. The strength of party 
identifications was measured with an item asking respondents how strongly or weakly they 
leaned toward this party altogether (“very strongly” to “very weakly”). The intermediate survey 
waves in 2014 and 2015 only offered the joint option “CDU/CSU” for the party identification 
  9 
item, and the subsequent survey waves offered the separate options “CDU” and “CSU” as well 
as the joint option. To harness the large number of respondents who chose the joint option, 
respondents from Bavaria, where the CSU competes, were added to the category “CSU”, while 
respondents from all other states were subsumed under the category “CDU”. Evidently, party 
identification is not restricted by state boundaries. Therefore, we re-ran all analyses without the 
respondents who chose the joint option and point out divergent results throughout the analysis.2 
In an attempt to provide a fine-grained analysis of effects exerted by crisis-induced 
dissonance between policy preferences and perceived party positions, we also consider changes 
in partisan attitudes and behaviors that fall short of but may lead to changes in party 
identification. Accordingly, we measure respondents’ general evaluations of the parliamentary 
parties. Recorded on an 11-point scale ranging from “very negative view” to “very positive 
view”, this measure is more likely to reflect situational influences and thus to reveal first cues 
for developments that may result in changing party identifications. For our analyses, all scales 
were converted to range between 0 and 1. Another indication for the waning influence of party 
identifications are supporters who cast their ballot for a party they do not identify with. 
Therefore, we included a measure for respondents’ vote choice, which asked respondents to 
indicate which party they had voted for in the past election. As self-reported recall questions 
are prone to bias, we use the vote choice reported in the first post-election wave instead of the 
current wave to measure panel respondents’ vote choice.3 
To measure respondents’ policy positions during the European debt crisis, we use an item 
asking whether European integration should be promoted toward implementing a European 
government in the near future, or whether European integration already went too far. As this 
measure is hardly ideal to capture respondents’ attitudes toward the Euro rescue, we also use 
                                                 
2 In our data, on average some 15 percent of the self-reported CDU identifiers reside in Bavaria and on average 
about 11 percent of the self-reported CSU identifiers reside in other states. 
3 The survey item on vote choice offered the joint option “CDU/CSU” instead of separate options, because the 
CSU only competes in Bavaria, where the CDU does not run. 
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an item directly asking respondents whether Germany should participate in the European 
financial aid for indebted EU member states, with responses ranging from “for German 
participation” to “against German participation”. Unfortunately, this second item is available 
in the campaign panel 2009–2013 only after the crisis, and we therefore have to draw on the 
first item for time-series analyses.4 Respondents’ policy positions during the European refugee 
crisis were queried using two items asking whether immigration restrictions should be tightened 
or relaxed, and whether foreigners should assimilate completely to German culture or live 
according to their own culture. The responses for the position items were given on an 11-point 
scale in the tracking surveys and on a 7-point scale in the panels, but were converted to range 
between 0 and 1 for the analyses. Parties’ perceived policy positions were measured 
analogously to items asking where the respondent thinks each party stands on an issue. 
To test whether identifiers’ policy positions and party attachments changed during the 
two crises, we subtracted identifiers’ pre-crisis ratings of policy positions and parties from their 
post-crisis ratings, thereby capturing the difference from before to after the crisis. In addition, 
we created dummy variables indicating whether respondents abandoned their party 
identification, changed their party identification to another party, or voted for another party 
during the crisis. We distinguish short-term5 changes occurring between the last pre-crisis wave 
and the first post-crisis wave from long-term changes emerging between the first wave of a 
cumulated panel and the post-election wave of the next campaign over four years later. 
In addition to changes over time, we also measure the distance between identifiers’ and 
parties’ perceived positions at one point in time. For reasons of data availability, these measures 
differ for the two crises. To measure policy proximity during the debt crisis, we calculated the 
absolute distance between identifiers’ and parties’ positions on German aid for indebted EU 
                                                 
4 The correlation between the two measures is around 0.57 in any given survey wave. 
5 Of course, short-term effects are rather “long” in the campaign panel 2009–2013, as there is a gap of nearly four 
years between the last pre- and the first post-crisis survey wave. 
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member states and weighted it by the personal importance of the issue.6 Thus, higher values 
indicate larger distances and higher issue importance. To measure how the refugee crisis 
impacted the policy proximity of identifiers and parties, we first calculated the distance between 
identifiers’ and parties’ positions on immigration for each survey wave. We then subtracted the 
pre-crisis distance from the post-crisis distance to determine if identifiers and parties moved 
apart on immigration. Here, we use an unweighted measure, as issue importance was not 
recorded for this item. As respondents’ own positions on immigration were queried in twice as 
many survey waves as the perceived positions of parties, we take advantage of this richer data 
by using an additional indicator measuring identifiers’ average pre-crisis positions on 
immigration at the cost of not being able to test the direct impact of identifiers’ perceptions. 
 
The European Debt Crisis 
Do party identifiers adopt their party’s position or adjust their party attachment when their 
party identification contradicts their policy preferences? Or do they simply endure the 
dissonance? To answer this question regarding the Euro crisis, we inspect citizens’ and parties’ 
positions relating to the debt crisis before, during, and after its occurrence, and then analyze 
intra-individual changes. The time-series data show that citizens’ mean positions on European 
integration and German aid for indebted Eurozone states are very stable over the period of the 
debt crisis. The average respondent continuously leaned slightly against furthering European 
integration, with minimal fluctuations of .04 points around the mean (mean value tracking 
surveys: .60, panel: .58; not shown here, see Appendix 2). Respondents’ attitudes toward 
German aid for other Eurozone member states were similarly stable over time. With mean 
positions of .38 in the tracking surveys and .39 in the panel, the average respondent was rather 
reluctant to spend German tax money on rescuing the Euro (results not shown, see Appendix 
                                                 
6 Since the item on German aid is available only after the crisis, we had to rely on post-crisis data here instead of 
comparing the pre- and post-crisis distance. 
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3). Altogether, despite the severity of the crisis, attitudes toward the Euro crisis remained 
strikingly stable.  
However, this impression of stability may be misleading, as supporters of different parties 
may have moved in different directions on these issues, with shifts balancing in the aggregate. 
Such contrary movements would contradict our expectation that identifiers of all parties except 
the Left move toward furthering European integration and endorsing German aid if identifiers 
follow their parties’ positions. On the other hand, identifiers’ positions should not move at all 
if they reconsider their party attachments based on their positions. To test whether the aggregate 
stability conceals shifts among party identifiers, we separate the mean positions on European 
integration and German aid by respondents’ party identification. In line with our expectations, 
the upper panel of Figure 1 shows that the changes in party identifiers’ positions on European 
integration were minimal (less than .1 points on a scale from 0 to 1). The same holds for German 
aid (bottom panel of Figure 1).7 Replicating the analysis with panel data yields substantively 
identical results, with no significant changes in party supporters’ positions on European 
integration and German aid (Appendix 4). In short, the aggregate stability does not conceal but 
rather reflects the stability of positions among the supporters of each party. 
 
- Figure 1 about here - 
 
Comparing the support for European action among party identifiers yields two interesting 
observations. First, the average level of support does not differ markedly between adherents of 
different parties. Using support for German aid in the tracking surveys as an example, we see 
that identifiers of the Greens, who were most in favor of German aid, have an average position 
of .48. They are thus just slightly more supportive than adherents of the Left, who were least 
                                                 
7 The slightly larger changes among supporters of the Greens and the Left are still far from substantive and likely 
due to the smaller number of respondents who identify with these parties. 
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supportive and whose mean position is still .33. Second, considering that the Left opposed the 
Euro rescue due to the likely ramifications for recipient countries’ welfare systems and that its 
adherents were the most skeptical toward European integration and German aid, the relative 
level of support among party identifiers could well reflect the political actions of their parties. 
Such an interpretation would suggest that identifiers aligned their positions with those of their 
party. 
So far, we have explored the positions of current party identifiers. However, identifiers 
who felt that their party chose the wrong strategy during the debt crisis may have abandoned 
their party identifications. In that case, the positions of pre-crisis identifiers would differ from 
those of current identifiers, which we can test by comparing the positions of respondents who 
identified with a party in July 2009, well before the debt crisis, with the positions of respondents 
who identified with a party in the survey wave when their position was recorded (hereafter 
current identifiers). Table 1 illustrates that the average positions of pre-crisis identifiers do not 
appreciably differ from those of current identifiers, providing no indication for a recomposition 
of parties’ support bases during the crisis. 
 
- Table 1 about here - 
 
To further test our argument, we compared the share of party identifiers who were for or 
against German aid over the course of the crisis. Figure 2 shows that, as expected, CDU, SPD, 
FDP, and Greens had more identifiers who supported German aid, whereas the majority of the 
adherents of the Left and the CSU opposed German aid. However, the trends for party 
identifiers who were for or against German aid diverge only minimally, if at all, during the debt 
crisis. The results remain stable when we use party approval ratings as dependent variable 
(results not shown, see Appendix 5). Hence, the results do not support the notion that identifiers 
who were dissatisfied with their parties’ approval of German aid relinquished their party 
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attachments. In summary, the descriptive results on citizens’ positions do not offer any 
indication that the debt crisis induced identifiers to follow their parties or to reconsider their 
attachments based on their positions. 
 
- Figure 2 about here - 
 
The finding that identifiers’ positions did not affect their partisanship, or vice versa, could 
mean two things. Either identifiers’ positions never came into conflict with the party line during 
the crisis, or their positions and attachments persisted despite a perceived dissonance between 
identifiers’ and parties’ stances. To determine which explanation applies for the debt crisis, we 
examine identifiers’ perceptions of their parties’ positions over time. Table 2 illustrates that, in 
general, perceptions of parties’ positions mirror parties’ behavior during the debt crisis: whereas 
most parties cluster above the midpoint in support of German aid for indebted Eurozone states, 
the Left is perceived as holding a markedly more negative position toward the Euro rescue. A 
comparison of the positions of identifiers (Table 1) and their parties (Table 2) shows that the 
average stance of supporters of all parties is more negative toward German aid than the 
perceived party position, although the difference is marginal for supporters of the Left. This 
gap was to be expected, as the internal opposition experienced by all parties but the Left should 
find expression in the mean positions of party supporters, but not in the perceptions of parties’ 
positions, which are guided by parties’ political actions. 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
What does this mean for identifiers, who opposed their parties’ reactions to the debt 
crisis? Did they ignore the rift between their own position and the party line? To answer this, 
we re-ran the analysis, separating the perceptions of identifiers who favored or opposed German 
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aid. Table 2 reveals a consistent pattern, in which supporters of the Euro rescue perceive parties 
as more inclined to help indebted Eurozone states, whereas opponents of the Euro rescue think 
of the same parties as more skeptical toward the Euro rescue. For instance, Left identifiers, who 
favored German aid and whose position thus contradicted the official party line, considered the 
position of the Left as neutral (mean .52), whereas opponents of German aid perceived the Left 
to be squarely against German aid (mean .26). The same pattern is observable for the other 
parties, though the difference in perceptions is not always statistically significant. Over time, 
perceptions converge for CDU, CSU, FDP, and Green supporters, but the gap becomes 
significant for SPD and Left identifiers. These differences indicate that motivated reasoning 
occurred among party identifiers, albeit not quite as expected. Instead of bringing their attitudes 
in line with perceived party positions, identifiers adapted their perceptions to reflect their own 
positions. Such misperceptions may have been fostered by the complex nature of the issue and 
the multitudinous intra-party fissures, which led to an equally complex coverage in the media 
that may have lent itself to, or even called for, interpretation. 
Although the aggregate descriptive results provide no indication that identifiers followed 
their parties’ positions or reconsidered their party attachments during the debt crisis, we 
analyzed intra-individual change in the panel data to be sure that these processes were not at 
work on the individual level. We first tested whether identifiers adopted the positions of their 
parties by regressing the distance between party identifiers’ pre- and post-crisis positions on 
European integration on their pre-crisis party identification. Party identification did not explain 
intra-individual changes in attitudes toward European integration, thus offering no indication 
that party identifiers followed their parties’ positions during the debt crisis (results not shown, 
see Appendix 6). 
We then examined the possibility that identifiers reconsidered their party attachments 
when the party line contradicted their positions on an issue. Here, party attachment was the 
dependent variable to be explained by the weighted gap between identifiers’ and their parties’ 
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positions toward the Euro rescue. Party attachment was measured with several indicators, 
including respondents’ party identifications, the strength of their identification, their probability 
to abandon their party identification, and their probability to switch their allegiance to another 
party. In addition, we included respondents’ party evaluations as a low-threshold indication of 
potential changes in party identifications. The results show that larger distances between 
identifiers’ and parties’ positions do not routinely undermine party attachments. However, the 
15 percent of CDU supporters whose position on the Euro rescue is removed at least .5 points 
from the party position rate their party around .15 points poorer after the crisis. In this group, 
around 31 percent (confidence interval: 17–45 percent) abandon their party identification in the 
short term, and this share rises to 47 percent (confidence interval: 32–61 percent) in the long 
term. The seven percent of Green identifiers with a distance of at least .5 to the Green position 
also evaluate their party around .21 points poorer in the long run (results not shown, see 
Appendix 7). 
In conclusion, the results provide some evidence that party identifiers rated their parties 
less favorably or even abandoned their attachments because their positions contradicted their 
parties’ political actions during the debt crisis, but these changes were mostly confined to 
supporters of the senior government party. This is in line with our expectation that effects might 
have been limited during the debt crisis, because the crisis itself as well as the party positions 
pertaining to it was relatively hard to comprehend in comparison to, for example, the European 
refugee crisis. Against this background, the position of the senior government party is most 
likely to have been perceived the clearest. 
 
The European Refugee Crisis 
To disentangle the impact of party attachments on identifiers’ positions, and vice versa, 
during the European refugee crisis, we again examine citizens’ and parties’ positions over the 
relevant period. We then use regression analyses to capture changes on the individual level. A 
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first look at citizens’ average positions on immigration and integration (whether foreigners 
should assimilate) reveals that they were as steady during the refugee crisis as during the debt 
crisis. Neither the mean position on immigration nor the mean position on integration changed 
considerably between 2014 and 2017 (results not shown, see Appendix 8). Respondents thus 
consistently supported a slight tightening of immigration restrictions (mean value tracking 
surveys: .6, panel: .66) and an extensive assimilation of foreigners to German culture (mean 
value tracking surveys: .33, panel: .32). 
To test whether the aggregate stability conceals balanced shifts among party identifiers, 
we separated the mean positions on immigration by respondents’ party identification. Figure 3 
illustrates that, unlike before, the aggregate stability does conceal some changes. Among 
tracking respondents, both CSU and AfD identifiers shifted their positions .12 points toward 
stricter immigration policies8, and the same trend is visible in the results of the panel analysis, 
in which AfD identifiers moved .14, and CSU supporters moved .13 points toward tighter 
immigration restrictions. At the same time, adherents of the CDU shifted .06 points toward 
more relaxed immigration policies during the refugee crisis. These shifts are more marked when 
we drop the observations from the “CDU/CSU” category, increasing to .18 for CSU supporters 
and doubling to .12 for CDU supporters. This contradicts the widely held belief that the CDU 
had become too liberal for its supporters. Moreover, whereas party identifiers’ positions toward 
the Euro rescue were rather similar, the mean positions with regard to immigration vary much 
more. Half the scale divides the mean positions of Green identifiers (.41), who were still only 
slightly in favor of relaxing immigration policies, and adherents of the AfD (.91), who strongly 
advocated more restrictive immigration policies. In between, the AfD is followed by CSU (.74), 
CDU, FDP (.62), SPD (.53), and the Left (.47). Thus, the shifts of CDU, CSU, and AfD 
supporters and the relative positioning of party identifiers both mirror the parties’ behavior 
                                                 
8 The somewhat larger fluctuations around the mean among identifiers of the FDP and the Left are most likely 
due to the smaller samples for these parties and do not mark a trend in one direction. 
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during the refugee crisis. With regard to our research question, this seems to fit with identifiers 
following their parties, rather than prioritizing their positions over their party identity. 
 
- Figure 3 about here - 
 
However, these changes occurred among current party identifiers; therefore, another 
plausible explanation for this finding could be that identifiers with attitudes that were at odds 
with the party line abandoned their party identifications during the refugee crisis. In this case, 
the mean positions of party identifiers would mirror the changes in official party positions, 
because party supporters would have realigned according to their positions on immigration. We 
explore that possibility by tracing the immigration positions of panel respondents who were 
party identifiers in June 2013 but may have abandoned or switched their identification during 
the refugee crisis. The results in Figure 4 indeed contrast strongly with the results for current 
party identifiers displayed in Figure 3(b). Respondents who identified with the CSU before the 
crisis still moved around .13 points toward more restrictive immigration policies, but neither 
pre-crisis identifiers of the CDU nor those of the AfD substantially shifted their positions. Pre-
crisis FDP identifiers, on the other hand, moved .14 points toward more restrictive immigration 
policies. In short, the attitudes toward immigration among adherents of the CDU, CSU, and 
AfD changed over time, reflecting shifts in their parties’ policies. However, these changes were 
not driven by pre-crisis identifiers changing their positions on immigration, implying that the 
policy shifts during the refugee crisis induced party identifiers to reconsider or even switch their 
attachments, leading to a recomposition of these parties’ support bases. 
 
- Figure 4 about here - 
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If this interpretation is correct, we should observe changes in the shares of party 
identifiers with opposite pre-crisis positions on immigration during the refugee crisis. Figure 5 
contrasts the attachments of party adherents who favored either a relaxation or a tightening of 
immigration restrictions during the refugee crisis. This reveals that, while the slopes for the two 
groups are roughly parallel for CSU, SPD, FDP, and Green identifiers, the trends change for 
supporters of the CDU, the Left and AfD. Among AfD adherents, the number of immigration 
opponents increased much faster than the number of immigration supporters, whereas the 
reverse is tue to a lesser degree for identifiers of the Left. Among CDU identifiers, immigration 
supporters became as prevalent as immigration opponents during the crisis. If we only analyze 
self-reported CDU identifiers, excluding respondents who chose the option “CDU/CSU”, 
immigration supporters even overtook the majority position previously held by opponents. 
These diverging trends as well as the differences in the development of immigration positions 
among current and pre-crisis identifiers point to identifiers following the position of the CSU, 
but changing their attachments toward CDU, AfD, and possibly the Left to reflect their 
positions on immigration. 
 
- Figure 5 about here - 
 
Our theoretical considerations posit that identifiers’ perceptions of their parties’ stances 
on specific issues are an important link between identifiers’ positions and their party 
attachments. To better understand how supporters’ perceptions may have influenced their 
positions and attachments, we explore how these perceptions changed over the course of the 
refugee crisis. Figure 6 shows that party identifiers’ average perceptions parallel the shifts in 
the positions of current identifiers (see Figure 3).9 In the eyes of their supporters, the CDU and 
                                                 
9 Because the positions of CDU/CSU were queried jointly and the position of the AfD was not asked at all before 
2017 in the campaign panel 2013–2017, Figure 9 draws on data from the tracking surveys. 
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the Left moved .16 and .15 points respectively toward relaxing immigration policies, whereas 
the CSU moved .13 points in the opposite direction and the AfD shifted .19 points toward 
restricting immigration. In other words, identifiers did perceive changes in the behavior of their 
parties during the refugee crisis, satisfying the theoretical condition for parties’ policy shifts to 
affect party attachments. Hence, the results strengthen our interpretation of the previous 
findings as issue-based changes of party identifications. 
 
- Figure 6 about here - 
 
Do we see the same patterns of party-cued and issue-based position changes on the 
individual level? To further corroborate that the refugee crisis induced some party identifiers to 
adopt their parties’ positions while prompting others to reconsider their party attachments, we 
analyze intra-individual changes over time using panel data. In these analyses, we distinguish 
long-term from short-term dynamics, comparing changes from shortly before to shortly after 
the crisis (June 2014-Oct 2016) with changes from long before to long after the crisis (June 
2013-Sep 2017). 
To determine whether identifiers followed their parties’ positions during the refugee 
crisis, we explore in a bivariate regression analysis how well the pre-crisis identifications of 
party supporters explain the shifts in their immigration attitudes. As the upper panel of Figure 
7 illustrates, party identification explains the long-term changes in the immigration positions of 
CSU and FDP supporters, but not the positions of other parties’ identifiers. To assess more 
directly the proposed mechanism, namely that identifiers perceive a change in their parties’ 
positions and move their own position accordingly, we repeat the analysis using changes in the 
perceived party positions from before to after the crisis as our independent variable. We find 
that changes in the perceived positions of their parties induced CDU and SPD supporters to 
shift their own positions slightly in the same direction (bottom panel of Figure 7). For CDU 
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identifiers, these shifts manifest during the crisis, but do not last. SPD supporters seem to have 
reacted only after the crisis, but shifts in their positions can be observed two years later. 
Curiously, the relation between a perceived change in the CSU position on immigration and the 
positions of CSU supporters is negative, that is CSU identifiers seem to become more positive 
toward immigration as the CSU shifts toward a more restrictive stance. Hence, we see some 
evidence that party identifiers adopted their parties’ positions during the refugee crisis. 
 
- Figure 7 about here - 
 
To test whether party identifiers whose positions were at odds with the party line 
reconsidered their party attachments, we again switch dependent and independent variables, 
regressing identifiers’ party attachments on increases in the absolute distance between 
identifiers’ and parties’ immigration positions from before to after the crisis. In addition to a 
party’s rating by its identifiers, identification strength, and the probability to give up or switch 
their attachment to another party, we also used the probability to vote for another party in 2017 
as an indicator for weakening party attachments. Because the CDU was the only party to 
substantially shift its position during the refugee crisis, we first explore how this shift influenced 
CDU identifiers’ attitudes and attachments. As Figure 8 shows, the 10 percent of the CDU 
identifiers for whom the distance between their position and the party line increased by at least 
.5 points on a scale from -1 to 1 tended to evaluate their own party less favorably, with ratings 
dropping by around .12 points in the short term and .19 points in the long term. This group did 
not rate the CSU10 better or rethink the strength of their attachment, but evaluated the AfD 
around .12 points more positively in the long run and was around twice as likely to vote for the 
AfD in 2017. These identifiers even had a 13 percent higher chance to abandon their 
                                                 
10 The negative coefficient for the CSU likely stems from the fact that immigration positions were queried jointly 
for the CDU and the CSU before the crisis. 
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partisanship right after the crisis and a 21 percent higher chance to do so in the long term (see 
Appendix 9 for the full analysis). 
 
- Figure 8 about here - 
 
Although CDU identifiers were the most likely candidates for issue-based changes in 
party attachments, the refugee crisis may also have affected supporters of pro-immigration 
parties, as their parties’ immigration preferences became more salient. Around six percent of 
the SPD identifiers, eight percent of the Green identifiers and ten percent of the Left identifiers 
experienced an increase of at least .5 points in the absolute distance between their positions and 
the party line from before to after the crisis. As Figure 9 shows, the affected SPD supporters 
rated their party .06 points more negatively right after the crisis and .11 points more negatively 
in the long term. Moreover, they had a higher probability to abandon their attachment in both 
time frames. A larger absolute distance also decreased the party evaluations of affected Green 
identifiers by .11 points, reduced identification strength for affected Left supporters by .08 
points, and doubled the latter’s odds to abandon their party identification in the long run. In 
other words, although the CDU was the only party to reverse its course on immigration during 
the refugee crisis, supporters of the SPD, the Greens and the Left likewise reconsidered their 
party attachments when the refugee crisis revealed that their parties’ position was farther from 
their own than anticipated. 
 
- Figure 9 about here - 
 
In a last step, we repeated the analyses above using identifiers’ pre-crisis positions on 
immigration to explain changes in their party attachments. The observed effects confirm the 
findings we obtained using the absolute distance between identifiers’ and parties’ positions as 
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the independent variable and are even slightly stronger. Analyzing the impact of CDU 
supporters’ pre-crisis migration attitudes on their party evaluations, we find that the 15 percent 
of CDU identifiers with very strong anti-immigration positions tended to rate their party .14 
points less favorably right after the refugee crisis and .22 points less favorably in the long term 
(Figure 10). Interestingly, this group evaluates the CSU .15 points more favorably right after 
the crisis, whereas assessments of the AfD improve .25 points, but only in the long run. CDU 
supporters who strongly opposed immigration were also 4.6 times as likely to defect at the 
ballot box and 5.2 times as likely to vote for the AfD in 2017 (results not shown, see Appendix 
10). Moreover, effects extended to party identifications. Almost one out of two (44.9 percent, 
confidence interval: 25.9–63.8 percent) CDU supporters with very strong anti-immigration 
positions gave up their party identification in the long run, with around 37 percent (confidence 
interval: 15.9-57.2 percent) switching their identification to the AfD (Figure 11). Importantly, 
these effects are not moderated by identification strength, which means that even strong 
partisans were affected. In summary, the results add to the evidence that party attachments 
among CDU identifiers, who opposed the relatively open immigration policy of Chancellor 
Merkel, weakened or even eroded during the refugee crisis. 
 
- Figure 10 and Figure 11 about here - 
 
Using pre-crisis anti-immigration positions to explain changes in vote choice, party 
evaluations, and identifications of the adherents of pro-immigration parties, we find that 
supporters of the SPD, the Greens, and the Left, who strongly opposed immigration before the 
refugee crisis, all lowered their post-crisis approval of their party, at least in the long term 
(Figure 12). This is the case for around 11 percent of SPD supporters, 5 percent of Green 
identifiers, and 16 percent of Left adherents, all of which also had higher odds to abandon their 
party attachments or switch to another party. In addition, a third of the affected Left adherents 
  24 
(33 percent, confidence interval: 18–49 percent) defected at the ballot box in 2017. When it 
comes to party identification, affected SPD identifiers felt .1 points less attached to their party 
after the refugee crisis. These findings support our conclusion that the issue-based changes in 
party attachments induced by the refugee crisis did not only affect CDU supporters but also 
adherents of the SPD, the Greens and the Left. 
 
- Figure 12 about here - 
 
Conclusion 
Over the last decade, the European debt and refugee crises have confronted European 
democracies with severe challenges, which had the potential to stabilize or undermine party 
identifications in the electorate. Our results suggest that the debt crisis and, even more so, the 
refugee crisis uncovered discrepancies between identifiers’ and parties’ positions toward 
important issues and prompted identifiers to resolve this dissonance in different ways. While 
there is no evidence that party identifiers ignored such inconsistencies outright, supporters did 
readily interpret their parties’ positions as matching their own during the debt crisis, when 
equivocal party messages allowed them to project their own positions on their parties. 
Supporters thus mostly eluded the choice to adapt their positions to their attachments or vice 
versa. 
That was not the case during the refugee crisis, when shifts in party positions were 
perceived quite clearly, inducing adherents without strong policy positions to adopt the party 
line. Only the attachments of identifiers who held strong positions on the issues weakened or 
eroded. Thus, party identification had a stabilizing effect for supporters whose positions were 
less distant from the party line. However, particularly strong positions on immigration 
undermined party identifications to the point of supporters switching their allegiances, mostly 
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to the AfD. Interestingly, the strength of party identifications, unlike the vehemence of policy 
positions, does not appear to have moderated these effects. 
From a party system perspective, our findings suggest that crises foster weakening 
attachments as well as de- and even realignment among party identifiers who have strong policy 
convictions. In the German case, for instance, each crisis induced more than five percent of the 
CDU identifiers to abandon their attachment in the long term, which results in a substantial 
cumulative decrease. Hence, salient societal challenges have the potential to induce substantial 
shifts in the balance of party systems. The changes in and the erosion of party attachments 
appear to have been driven by two crises, which made policy attitudes salient. Broadly 
speaking, these policy attitudes refer to questions of national sovereignty, demarcation, 
international cooperation, and openness (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2008; see also Preißinger et al. in this 
volume). Accordingly, our findings may be read as demonstrating two (event-specific) steps in 
a process of issue-based de- and realignment that made the conflict revolving around openness 
and demarcation (see, e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2018) more prominent in German electoral 
politics. 
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Note: The x-lines depict the beginning and the end of the most salient phase of the debt crisis. 
Figure 1: Current party identifiers’ mean positions toward the Euro rescue (tracking surveys) 
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Table 1: Current and pre-crisis party identifiers’ mean positions on European integration (panel) 
 
 August 2009 August 2013 
Party Current Pre-crisis Current Pre-crisis 
CDU 0.552 0.537 0.601 0.598 
CSU 0.581 0.641 0.594 0.653 
SPD 0.552 0.565 0.562 0.560 
FDP 0.516 0.473 0.505 0.449 
Greens 0.431 0.444 0.510 0.504 
The Left 0.625 0.581 0.593 0.616 
 
 
Figure 2: Party identification among supporters (filled dots) and opponents (hollow dots) of German aid (panel) 
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Table 2: Comparison of perceived party positions on German aid among all party identifiers, identifiers who are 
against, and identifiers who are for the Euro rescue (panel) 
 August 2013 September 2013 
Party All Against For All Against For 
CDU 0.711 0.648 0.781 0.722 0.695 0.752 
CSU 0.611 0.544 0.694 0.648 0.583 0.708 
SPD 0.652 0.615 0.685 0.622 0.588 0.671 
FDP 0.611 0.591 0.625 0.587 0.583 0.589 
Greens 0.535 0.427 0.608 0.556 0.487 0.590 
The Left 0.423 0.325 0.539 0.303 0.226 0.489 
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Figure 3: Current party identifiers’ mean positions on immigration 
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Figure 4: Pre-crisis party identifiers’ mean positions on immigration (panel) 
 
 
Figure 5: Party identification among supporters and opponents of immigration (panel) 
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Figure 6: Perceived party positions on immigration among party identifiers (tracking surveys) 
 
  34 
 
 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients of univariate linear regression analyses. 
 
Figure 7: Identifiers following their parties during the refugee crisis 
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Note: Unstandardized coefficients of univariate linear regression analyses. 
 
Figure 8: Effect of an increasing distance between CDU identifiers’ and the CDU’s position on immigration on 
party evaluations from before to after the crisis 
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Note: Unstandardized coefficients of univariate linear regression analyses (evaluation, PID strength) and average 
marginal effects from a logistic regression analysis (erosion). 
 
Figure 9: Effect of an increasing distance between party identifiers’ own and the party position on immigration 
on party attachments from before to after the crisis 
 
 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients of univariate linear regression analyses. 
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Figure 10: Effect of identifiers’ pre-crisis anti-immigration attitude on party evaluations from before to after the 
crisis 
 
 
Note: Reported are predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals at different levels of anti-immigration 
attitudes. The histogram shows the distribution of anti-immigration attitudes.  
 
Figure 11: Effect of identifiers’ pre-crisis anti-immigration attitude on de- and realignment 
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Note: Unstandardized coefficients of univariate linear regression analyses. 
 
Figure 12: Effect of identifiers’ pre-crisis anti-immigration attitude on their party attachments 
